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Using a Chinese sample containing 8727 firm-years over the period from 2005 to 2010, we 
investigate the economic effect of interlocking directorate networks, and find that firms with 
central position measured by network centrality in interlocking directorate networks earn superior 
one- to three-year ahead performance measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on Sales 
(ROS). We also show that the economic effect of interlocking directorate network is more 
pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs) compared to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
Our evidence is important, because it shows that to some extent the interlocking directorate 
network can serve as an solution to the institutional voids which are derived from the reform in 
Chinese translation economy.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
ocial and economic networks have deeply attracted considerable attentions of economists and sociologists 
in recent years. These networks act a role of a conduit for interpersonal and inter-organizational resource 
and information flow, and thus are a central feature of virtually all economic activates. One important 
network in corporate finance is the interlocking directorate network which is exercised by directors who sit on two 
or more boards of companies, namely, interlocking directorates (Mizruchi, 1996). The interlocking directors in these 
networks are the channels by which information and resource are communicated, new relationships are formed, and 
existing relationships are promoted, and in turn have an economic effect on firm performance. 
 
Several exiting studies examine the economic impact of the interlocking directorates on firm performance, 
while they provide inconsistent evidence. Some studies find that interlocking directorates adversely affect firm 
performance, manifest in a positive market reaction following the departure of interlocking directors (Fich and 
Shivdasani, 2006) and increase the probability of accounting fraud (Beasley, 1996). Other studies, however, show 
that interlocking directorates are positively related to shareholder wealth, offer larger premiums in tender offers 
(Cotter et al.,1997), and generate superior returns from acquisitions (Harris and Shimizu, 2004). The collective 
evidence from the literature on the economic effect of interlocking directorates highlight the uncertainty of the 
association between interlocking directorates and firm performance, and relative absence of investigation beyond 
US. In this paper, we try to contribute to the existing literature on interlocking directorates by providing additional 
evidence on its economic effect, but with respect to an translation economy, China. Specifically, we investigate the 
two following questions: (1) is there an empirical relationship between a firm’s performance and its position within 
an interlocking directorate network; and (2) if it is, dose such a relationship vary across different types of firms?  
 
We carry our investigations by using a comprehensive sample of 8727 firm-years of Chinese listed firms 
over the period from 2005 to 2010. Implying standard Social Network Analysis, we form annual interlocking 
directorate networks by interlocking directorates, and then calculate the importance of a firm’s position in the 
S 
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interlocking network using three standard measures of network centrality: degree, eigenvector and betweenness 
centrality (Grewal et al., 2006). To capture the aggregate character of a firm’s network position, we also compute the 
equal-weight average of the three centralities as a aggregated measure. 
 
First, we investigate the economic impact of interlocking directorate networks on firm performance. By 
regressing the one- to three-year ahead firm performance measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on sales 
(ROS) on the centrality measures, we find that firms that are more networked can earn significantly higher ROA and 
ROS in future one to three years. Our results show that, by one interlock increased, ROA (ROS) of a firm would rise 
by 1.5% (6.8%) in one-year ahead. Thus, the performance effect of interlocking directorates is economically 
significant, given that the mean ROA (ROS) across all firm-years is 2.3% (5%). We interpret the positive centrality-
performance relation as evidence that, all else equal, firms on average benefit from being networked in the 
interlocking directorate network.  
 
Our first investigation is motivated by the idea that the interlocking directorate network is a solution to 
institutional voids in translation countries (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). China is undergoing a broadly economic 
reform, most of central planning policies have been abolished, whereas a mass of market-oriented policies have been 
built but not yet to be fully implemented. Thus it leads to institutional voids in economic activities (Khanna and 
Palepu, 1997). Chinese companies deeply suffer from uncertainty of economic policies and the incremental 
significant transaction cost which are derived from institutional voids. Being networked by interlocking directorates, 
a firm can use interpersonal relationship of interlocking directors to better archive knowledge, public policies, 
contracts and resources, which facilitate the ability of settling uncertainty, relaxing resource constrains and reducing 
transaction cost, and hence yield economic benefits.  
 
Next, we examine the whether the economic effects of interlocking directorate network vary across the 
state ownership status of firms, namely state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs). 
The evidence indicates that the association between centrality and firm future performance is more pronounced in 
NSOEs. We interpret the results as that, all else equal, NSOEs can benefit more from being networked by 
interlocking directorates relative to SOEs and that performance measures reflect these benefits. 
 
The second investigation is motivated by the fact that SOE property is owned by Chinese government and 
most executives of SOEs currently sever as government officers. Thus, SOEs can capture more support and 
protection from government at a lower cost, and suffer less from uncertainty, resource constraints and institutional 
voids compared to NSOEs. In turn, NSOEs stand to benefit more from the interlocking directorate networks which 
provide a solution to these disadvantage caused by institutional voids in Chinese business environment.  
 
Collectively, the results of our paper provide evidence that firms that are more networked though 
interlocking directorates exhibit better future performance and the economic effect of interlocking directorate 
network is more pronounced in NSOEs than SOEs. These results are not sensitive to several robust tests that we 
estimate a change in change specification of centrality-performance relation, and measure firm performance by 
market-adjusted stock price return and Tobin’s Q. Our results contribute to the interlocking directorates literature by 
extending research setting to a translation economy in which firm are in different ownership control status and hence 
lead to difference in economic effect of interlocking directorate networks. Further, our evidence also suggest that not 
only interlocks of a firm matter, but also the network position of a firm matter; the investigation on the network 
position are rare.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and section 3 describes 
the data, the centrality measures of interlocking directorate networks and its characteristics. Section 4 discusses our 
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2.  RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1.  Theories and Evidences on Interlocking Directorates and Firm Performance 
 
The exiting literature on the relationship between interlocking directorates and firm performance falls 
broadly into two streams. In one link of the studies, resource dependency hypothesis suggests that companies may 
benefit from appointing directors with multiple positions as their directors (Ferris et al., 2003). Interlocking directors 
may not only bring in a wealth of accumulated knowledge and experience to the boardroom, but also serve as better 
conduits for establishing linkages between a firm and its external environments. Interlocking directorates may 
benefit companies though reducing environment uncertain and promoting the ability to access to network resource, 
hence resulting in a better future performance and thus an improved market value. This rich body of research 
consists largely of descriptive work from a range of different countries, such as large-sample statistical work set in 
US (Booth and Deli, 1996), Chile (Khanna and Thomas, 2009), India (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2009) and so on. 
 
A second important stream of studies based on busyness directors hypothesis emphasizes the negatively 
effect of interlocking directorates on firm performance. This line of studies was pioneered by Ferris et al., (2003), 
whose writing argues that an individual who sit on multiple boards would become over-committed, and thereby 
compromise on his/hers ability to monitor company management effectively on the behalf of the shareholders. Some 
research find that the number of interlocking directors of a firm is associated with poorer performance in future 
(Fligstein and Brantley, 1992), lower the sensitivity of CEO turnover, a positive market reaction following the 
departure of an interlocking director (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006), lead to excess remuneration of CEOs (Core et al., 
1999), and increase the probability of committing accounting fraud (Beasley, 1996). 
 
All of the theoretical arguments and most of the limited evidence that exists on the costs and benefits of 
interlocking directorates are restricted predominantly to developed countries, specifically to the US. It is difficult to 
generalize the findings of these studies because the ambiguous nature of these findings may be a reflection of 
uncertainty over the association between interlocking directorates and profitability in different economies. How 
interlocking directorates affect firm performance is not fully known for transition economies, such as China. 
Additionally, other limitation in previous studies is that they do not fully capture the position of a firm within an 
interlocking directorate network, for example, most of the previous literature only count how many interlocking 
directors of a firm, and take it as an explanatory proxy of firm interests. There is an absence of counting the degree 
to which a company is networked.  
 
In this paper, we attempt to theoretically analyze how interlocking directorate networks affect firm 
performance in Chinese transition economy from the institutional economics perspective. We do not disagree with 
the resource dependent view on interlocking directorates’ function in improving firm performance. Companies in 
Chinese really suffer from insufficient resources and interlocking directorates do help to relax the resource 
constraint. More importantly, companies suffer more from the institutional voids that currently exist in Chinese 
transition economy (Ma et al., 2006). A company may connect with other companies by appointing individuals with 
interlocking directorates, and then is involved into an interlocking directorate network form which the company 
could capture interlock social capital. We view interlock social capital as the relation among directors and 
companies that provide companies access to information and resource that flow or embed in the interlocking 
directorate network. We argue that the interlock social capital plays a critical a role in filling some institutional voids, 
and hence significantly improve firm performance in Chinese business environment. 
 
2.2.  Institutional Voids: Improved Performance by Being Networked 
 
China is undergoing a broadly economic reform from central planning economy to market-oriented 
economy. In the past three decades, most of central planning policies have been abolished, and a mass of market-
oriented policies have been built but not yet to be effectively implemented, which lead to institutional voids.  
Additionally, the efficiency and enforcement of Chinese legal and court system is regarded as inefficiency in dispute 
resolution, especially for business litigation. (Allen, et. al., 2005). As a result, Chinese companies suffer from such 
institutional voids in two ways: uncertainty of economic policies and incremental transaction cost. 
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As known to all, Chinese economic reform is not based on any exiting case; rather, it is “Crossing River by 
Groping for Stone”, a well-known metaphor often attributed to Deng Xiaoping’s “Market Socialism” framework, 
meaning that the reform is simply guided by an “error-and-adjustment” pattern. It is very frequent for Chinese 
government to readjust the public policies, industry promotion/demotion plans, interest rate, even tax regulations. In 
turn, the business environment stays a high level of uncertainty, which acts as a role of operating risk and hence 
impairs compromise profitability. 
 
Several prominent economists have argued that institutions shape economic outcomes. one important role 
of institutions is “to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable structure … institutions affect the performance of 
economy by their effect on the costs of exchange and production”(North, 1990). The higher transaction cost is an 
important consequence of institutional voids. In Chinese business environment, contract governance mechanism is 
not effective and not enough to support transaction parties to predict the outcomes of transaction contracts. So 
transaction parties always take more action to explore each other’s prestige, and monitor each other over payment 
and after-services. This, in turn, brings our extra transaction cost, even prevents exchange when one party over 
worries about the unpredicted outcomes of transaction contracts. What’s worse, the weak legal and court system has 
less ability to serve as a final and effective violation-and-punishment mechanism for transaction dispute, and hence 
result in extra self-protection behavior which is very costly. 
 
Interlocking directorate networks give a company interlock social capital that work as a solution to the 
incremental uncertainty of business environment and cost of transaction resulted from institutions voids in China. 
On the one hand, previous research has suggested that interlocking directorates may play a role of linkages between 
companies and its external environment. Here, we believe that interlock social capital help companies to promote 
the ability to settle environment changes. In particular, interlock social capital benefit companies by facilitating the 
access to information about public policies and the activities of other companies, and it also help companies to relax 
resource constrains through facilitating cooperation within interlocking directorate network. Companies with central 
position in a network should find it easier to access to useful information and necessary resource; these advantages 
could be developed into the abilities to adapt themselves to (not necessarily reduce) environment uncertainties, and 
hence resulting in financial profitability improved. 
 
On the other hand, interlock social capital reduce transaction cost by the way of guanxi-based exchanges in 
Chinese business environment. A company could establish personalized relationships or the guanxi with other 
companies by sharing interlocking directors. Thus, guanxi-based exchanges appear to substitute for formal or 
contract-based exchanges, and it helps to save transaction cost (Peng and Luo, 2000). As an important transaction 
governance mechanism in Chinese business environment, Guanxi control opportunism behavior at much lower cost 
than that of legal and court system. Pervious works had suggested that guanxi had permeated the economic sphere as 
a “second currency”, and it constitutes a secret to corporate success. Companies who maintain a better guanxi 
network in operating activities take competitive advantages over the others. Indeed, a special word “guanxihu” 
derived from guanxi is widely used to name such competitive advantages of companies being networked in Chinese 
business practice (Park and Luo, 2001). Specifically, guanxihu as buyers are likely to access to goods of higher 
quality, and gain more from extension of commercial credit, while guanxihu as sellers are expected to achieve a 
higher performance of sales. Further, guanxi-based exchange helps to simplify trade procedures and deepen 
relationship among companies involved in the same interlock network. As a result, companies being more 
networked could benefit more from interlock social capital in a long run. 
 
In summary, there are strong theory and evidence indicate that company performance benefit from its 
interlocking directorate network in Chinese business environment, achieved by promoting the ability of settling 
uncertainty, relaxing resource constrains and reducing transaction cost. Building on the above, we seek to examine 
whether firm performance are facilitated by being networked though interlocking directorates. Therefore, our first 
hypothesis (in alternative form) is: 
 
H1:  Firms that are more networked through interlocking directorates exhibit higher performance.  
 
If the performance effect of interlocking directorate network we argue above is hold, we next consider 
whether the relation is also persistent across different types of firms. Specifically, identifying the characteristics of 
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firms for which this association is particularly strong can provide insights into possible underlying economic 
mechanisms driving the performance associated with interlocking directorates. The idea that interlocking directors 
provide access to competitive edge such as the ability of settling uncertainty, relaxing resource constrains and 
reducing transaction cost suggests that the impact of interlocking directorates on firm performance should be most 
pronounced among firms that are most likely to benefit from such competitive edges, namely, NSOEs.  
 
It is interest to note that SOEs in China is used by the government to facilitate institutional reform (Gupta 
and Wang, 2004; Yiu et al., 2005).  Further, most executives of SOEs are appointed by government and currently 
sever as government officers.  Hence, it is easier for SOEs to capture support and protection from government, and 
in turn they suffer less from uncertainty, resource constraints, and institutional voids compared to NSOEs. For 
NSOEs, such an advantage does not exist, but they can use interlocking directorate network as a substitute to make 
up for the lack of unambiguous contract transaction mechanism and to solve the consequent problems.  Thus, 
NSOEs would benefit more from interlocking director networks.  Therefore, our second hypothesis is:  
 
H2:  The performance effect of interlocking directorate network is more pronounced in NSOEs than SOEs.   
 
3.  EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1.  Data and Sample Description 
 
The data for our analysis is obtained from the CSMAR database which provides information on listed-firms 
in China. To select our sample, we take two steps: first, we require that directors’ resumes are available in CSMAR 
to identify interlocking directors, which restricts our sample to the post-2005 period and we obtain 9896 firm-years. 
Secondly, we delete financial sector because financial firms have special financial statements, and then exclude 
companies with missing data for multivariate analysis. At last, our sample contains 1893 firms and 8727 firm-years. 
 
3.2.  Centrality of Interlocking Directorate Networks 
 
For each node/firm in a network, we construct three measures of centrality that are standard in social 
network analysis. The measures capture three separate dimensions in which a node can be considered important in a 
network. Let A be the n×n adjacency matrix of an network, where n is the number of firms. Cell Aij=1 if firm i and 
firm j share one or more directorates; otherwise Aij=0. The first measure is DEGREE centrality (Faust, 1997), which 







                                                                        (1) 
 
A higher value of DEGREE implies that the firm shares directors with more firms. Intuitively, more shared 
directorships with other firms may provide with a company better ability of settling uncertainty, relaxing resource 
constrains and reducing transaction cost. 
 
Our second centrality measure, EIGEN, is eigenvector centrality (Bonacich,2007), which measures node’s 
importance in terms of the centrality of its neighbors. EIGEN defines the centrality of a node to be proportional to 





i i j jj
EIGEN A EIGEN 

                                                               (2) 
 
Rewrite n expressions into a linear equation system as: λE=AE, where E is equal to a column vector 
[EIGEN1, EIGEN2,…, EIGENn]; λ is a eigenvalue of matrix A. E and λ are available by using standard the 
eigenvector-eigenvalue formulation to solve the linear equation system. To obtain positive values for every members 
of the network, let λ to be the largest eigenvalue. Thus, EIGEN is exactly the eigenvector centrality (Faust, 1997). 
As such, EIGEN attempts to capture the extent to which a firm is connected to other important nodes of the network, 
i.e., the notions of power and prestige. Since in the eigenvector centrality the sum of direct linkages is weighted by 
their own centralities, EIGEN is natural extension of the degree centrality based on adjacency relation. 
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The position of the firm in network is important if a firm can control many linkages among others.  The 
third measure, betweenness centrality (Linton, 1997), is designed to capture this effect:  
 
[( ( ) / )], ,i jk jk
j k
BETWE g i g j k i

                                                         (3) 
 
Where gjk is the number of the linkages between firm j and firm k, and gjk(i) is the number of paths between firm j 
and firm k that passing firm i. One can interpret the distance of the shortest path between two companies to be 
proportional to the costs of communication or obtaining favors among them, and as such we can interpret BETWE as 
a measure proportional to the average cost of communicating with or obtaining favors from another firm. 
 
At last, in order to capture the total effects of a firm’s network position, we combine the three individual 
measures by taking the equal-weighted average and label it as CENTR: 
 
( ) / 3i i i iCENTR DEGREE EIGEN BETWE                                                 (4) 
 
Table 1 contains centrality statistics of our final sample. In the Panel A of Table 2 we report the yearly 
distribution in term of the number of interlocking directors held by firms. Of the 8727 firm-years, only 16.7% (1457) 
have no interlocking director, with a minimum value 14.61% in year 2010 and a max value 19.07% in year 2005. 
Only around 16.36% of the sample firms have five or more interlocking directors. If the board of a firm with five or 
more interlocking directors is defined as a busy board, thus 16.36% of the sample firms have busy boards. It is a 
relatively small incidence of busy boards in China which is much lower than the level of 68% in India (Sarkar and 
Sarkar, 2009) and the level of 21.42% in the USA (Stokman and Wasseur, 2002). Panel B of Table 1 presents the 
annual summary statistics of firms’ network centrality measures.  
 
Table 1. Sample Statistics 
Panel A provides the number of firms and DEGREE distribution, and Panel B contains the pooled sample averages for each year 
of the 2005-2010 sample. All centrality measures (DEGREE, EIGEN, BETWE, and CENTR) are detailed in Section 3.2. 
Panel A: Firms counts and DEGREE distributions by year 
DEGREE  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  All 
  Freq.  %  Freq.  %  Freq.  %  Freq.  %  Freq.  %  Freq.  %  Freq.  % 
=0  259  19.07  255  18.76  248  17.43  243  15.93  201  14.96  251  14.61  1457  16.70 
=1  263  38.44  256  37.60  239  34.22  227  30.82  199  29.76  257  29.57  1441  33.21 
=2  222  54.79  223  54.01  246  51.51  245  46.89  209  45.31  252  44.24  1397  49.22 
=3  193  69.00  214  69.76  194  65.14  222  61.44  178  58.56  247  58.61  1248  63.52 
=4  149  79.97  145  80.43  157  76.18  181  73.31  175  71.58  213  71.01  1020  75.20 
=5  85  86.23  102  87.93  126  85.03  143  82.69  129  81.18  153  79.92  738  83.66 
>5  187  100  164  100  213  100  264  100  253  100  345  100  1426  100 
                             
Panel B: Firm counts and sample averages by year 
 Obs. DEGREE EIGEN BETWE CENTR 
2005 1358 2.248 3.724 1.572 7.545 
2006 1359 2.353 3.527 1.289 7.169 
2007 1423 2.296 3.320 0.859 6.474 
2008 1525 1.649 3.084 0.959 5.692 
2009 1344 1.810 2.854 0.947 5.612 
2010 1718 2.137 3.062 0.899 6.098 
All 8727 2.071 3.229 1.061 6.362 
 
4． EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
4.1． Performance Prediction 
 
To test hypothesis H1, we estimate the fallowing regressions: 
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Performancet+i=α0+α1IDNCt+αkControlst, i=1,2 or 3                                         (5) 
 
The dependent variable, Performance, is firm future performance which is most widely measured by 
Return on Asset (ROA). Considering some debate concerning on the use of ROA rather than return on sales (ROS) as 
a measure of profitability, we also chose to measure it by focusing on ROS. IDNC is the interlocking directorate 
network centralities including individual centrality (DEGREE, EIGEN and BETWE) and our aggregated proxy 
(CENTR). To control for systemic variation in future ROA or ROS, Equation (5) includes five control variables: (1) 
current ROA or ROS. As pervious literature showed, financial performance has a strong persistence (Sloan, 1996) 
and hence the past and future ROA or ROS is highly correlated (Mozes 1992); (2) Size defined as the logarithm of 
the total assets at the end of year, and firm size is not only found to be positively correlated with profitability, but 
also suggested to be associated with the number of interlocking directors; (3) Capex measured by the ratio of capital 
expenditure to total assets, which captures the extent to which capital expenditures are spent on fixed asset to create 
future benefits; (4) LEV defined as the ratio of the liabilities to total assets; and (5) Growth measured as the growth 
of sales, which control the larger change in income as a result of a change in revenue. Additionally, to address the 
unobserved effect of industry and time, we include a vector of industry dummies and a vector of year dummies as 
controls.  
 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics of our final sample and the correlations among the variables 
involved in multivariate analysis. Generally, the correlations between the explanatory variables are lower than 0.5, it 
suggests that the problem of multicollinearity is not a concern in multivariate analysis. The firm profitability proxies 
including ROA and ROS are correlated positively and significantly with three individual centrality measures and the 
aggregated proxy, though we do not focus on such homophonous relationship. Additionally, the correlation 
coefficients among the four centrality proxies are strongly positive. But correlation coefficients between DEGREE 
(EIGEN) and BETWE is a relatively small value small 0.43 (0.30), it indicates that betweenness centrality could 
capture the information not adequately captured by degree (eigenvector) centrality (i.e. the number of interlocks). 
 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Panel A provides the descriptive statistics of the variable involved in multiple analysis and Panel B reports the correlations 
among variables. *, **, ***Significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Please see Appendix for variable definitions. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean St.dev P25 Median P75 Obs. 
ROA 0.021 0.089 0.009 0.029 0.056 8727 
ROS 0.005 0.434 0.014 0.047 0.107 8727 
Size 21.334 1.068 20.612 21.230 21.972 8727 
Growh 0.245 0.558 0.006 0.158 0.349 8727 
CAPEX 0.063 0.063 0.015 0.043 0.090 8727 
Leverage 0.518 0.260 0.366 0.507 0.636 8727 
DEGREE 2.071 11.445 0.093 0.233 0.397 8727 
EIGEN 3.229 12.600 0.009 0.157 1.000 8727 
BETWE 1.061 7.603 0.000 0.098 0.469 8727 
CENTR 6.362 29.231 0.142 0.685 2.000 8727 
       
Panel B: Correlation matrix 
 ROA ROS Size Growth CAPEX Leverage DEGREE EIGEN BETWE 
ROS 0.775***         
Size 0.210*** 0.192***        
Growth 0.215*** 0.173*** 0.077***       
CAPEX 0.236*** 0.165*** 0.173*** 0.053***      
Leverage -0.471*** -0.383*** -0.0019 0.012 -0.142***     
DEGREE 0.070*** 0.053*** 0.093*** -0.025** -0.006 -0.032***    
EIGEN 0.070*** 0.049*** 0.127*** -0.017 -0.008 -0.016 0.735***   
BETWE 0.049*** 0.043*** 0.077*** -0.004 -0.017 -0.028** 0.429*** 0.297***  
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Panel A of Table 3 presents the pooled regression results from regressing future one- to three-year ROA on 
the three centrality measures and aggregate proxy.  T-statistics in parentheses are clustered by both firm and year to 
account for cross-sectional and time-series dependence in the residuals (Petersen, 2009). Industry and year fixed 
effects are included throughout. The regression results demonstrate that all three centrality measures are 
significantly related to future performance. For instance, the coefficient of DEGREE on one-year ahead ROA is 
0.015 with a t-statistic of 2.97, implying that the one unit increase in DEGREE would rises ROA by 1.5%. Thus, the 
effect of interlocking directorates is economically significant, given that the mean ROA across all firm-years is 2.3%.  
 
Given the robust association between the three standard centrality measures and future performance, it is 
not surprising that our aggregated centrality proxy, CENTR, also demonstrates a statistically significant association 
with the future performance. Additionally, The performance effect of interlocking directorates network is hold when 
we substitute ROS for ROA. Panel B of Table 3 reports the results with future ROS as dependent variables.  
 
Together, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that being central in interlocking directorate 
networks allows for better access to the ability of settling uncertainty, relaxing resource constrains and reducing 
transaction cost, and hence better performance. 
 
Table 3. The regression results of firms’ future performance and centrality measures 
Panel A and Panel B provide the results on the relationship between firms’ centrality and future performance measured by ROA 
and ROS, respectively. DEGREE, EIGEN, BETWE and CENTR are proxied by IDNC in column (1, 5 and 9), (2, 6 and 10), (3,7 
and 11) and (4, 8 and 12), respectively. The t-values in parentheses are clustered at both year and firm levels. Year and industry 
fixed effect are controlled but not tabulated. *, **, ***Significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. See Appendix for definitions 
of variables.  
Panel A: Regression results on future three year firm performance (ROA) 
 ROAt+1  ROAt+2  ROAt+3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
_cons -0.041 -0.035 -0.038 -0.038  -0.058 -0.049 -0.052 -0.052  -0.066 -0.069 -0.061 -0.063 
 (-1.17) (-1.06) (-1.16) (-1.11)  (-1.12) (-1.04) (-1.09) (-1.07)  (-1.02) (-1.02) (-0.97) (-1.01) 
ROA 0.377*** 0.383*** 0.313*** 0.380***  0.287*** 0.290*** 0.220*** 0.291***  0.218*** 0.219*** 0.219*** 0.219*** 
 (14.05) (13.99) (13.74) (13.93)  (5.06) (5.10) (5.09) (5.09)  (12.67) (12.74) (13.04) (12.81) 
Size 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003  0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (1.54) (1.56) (1.59) (1.57)  (1.29) (1.18) (1.19) (1.19)  (0.76) (0.79) (0.72) (0.77) 
Growth 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***  0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004*  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (4.99) (4.75) (4.86) (4.82)  (1.69) (1.68) (1.66) (1.68)  (0.23) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) 
Capex 0.095*** 0.099*** 0.098*** 0.096***  0.090*** 0.091*** 0.090*** 0.091***  0.044*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 
 (5.79) (5.89) (5.92) (5.85)  (4.37) (4.47) (4.45) (4.44)  (3.01) (3.01) (3.03) (3.014) 
LEV -0.019** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019***  -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.030  -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.024*** 
 (-2.53) (-2.52) (-2.54) (-2.54)  (-4.37) (-4.31) (-4.41) (-4.35)  (-5.26) (-5.33) (-5.31) (-5.31) 
IDNC 0.015*** 0.663*** 0.988*** 0.543***  0.014* 0.611* 0.826*** 0.498**  0.014* 0.463 0.716*** 0.347** 
 (2.97) (2.714) (5.77) (3.47)  (1.93) (1.68) (2.83) (2.12)  (1.94) (1.38) (3.15) (1.99) 
Obs. 8727 8727 8727 8727  7551 7551 7551 7551  6246 6246 6246 6246 
Adj. R2 0.221 0.221 0.221 0.221  0.115 0.115 0.115 0.115  0.101 0.100 0.101 0.101 
               
Panel B: Regression results on future three year firm performance (ROS) 
 ROSt+1  ROSt+2  ROSt+3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
_cons -0.408** -0.387** -0.404** -0.396**  -0.521** -0.501** -0.512** -0.509**  -0.719*** -0.707*** -0.704*** -0.708*** 
 (-2.45) -(2.44) (-2.44) (-2.44)  (-2.43) (-2.40) (-2.45) (-2.42)  (-3.14) (-3.21) (-3.18) (-3.19) 
ROS 0.265*** 0.266*** 0.266*** 0.266***  0.139** 0.140** 0.140** 0.140**  0.161*** 0.162*** 0.162*** 0.162*** 
 (6.62) (6.61) (6.54) (6.58)  (2.27) (2.28) (2.27) (2.27)  (3.15) (3.15) (3.16) (3.15) 
Size 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.020***  0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 0.019**  0.019** 0.020** 0.019** 0.019** 
 (2.64) (2.64) (2.58) (2.62)  (2.34) (2.32) (2.34) (2.33)  (2.43) (2.51) (2.45) (2.47) 
Growth 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045***  0.018** 0.018** 0.017** 0.018**  -0.009 -0.010 (-0.010 -0.010 
 (3.25) (3.25) (3.26) (3.25)  (2.27) (2.22) (2.21) (2.22)  (-0.82) (-0.89) (-0.86) (-0.86) 
Capex 0.407*** 0.410*** 0.407*** 0.408***  0.356*** 0.358*** 0.356*** 0.357***  0.129 0.128 (0.127 0.128 
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 (4.24) (4.26) (4.25) (4.25)  (4.08) (4.16) (4.12) (4.13)  (1.44) (1.44) (1.42) (1.43) 
LEV -0.150*** -0.152*** -0.152*** -0.151***  -0.128*** -0.129*** -0.128*** -0.129***  -0.094*** -0.096*** -0.094*** -0.095*** 
 (-2.62) (-2.63) (-2.61) (-2.62)  (-4.21) (-4.18) (-4.24) (-4.20)  (-3.35) (-3.37) (-3.31) (-3.34) 
IDNC 0.068** 0.300** 4.503*** 1.446***  0.076** 0.306* 4.221** 1.457**  0.081** 0.234 5.238** 1.633** 
 (2.24) (2.06) (3.33) (2.78)  (1.97) (1.69) (2.21) (2.02)  (2.23) (1.43) (2.19) (1.98) 
Obs. 8727 8727 8727 8727  7551 7551 7551 7551  6246 6246 6246 6246 
Adj. R2 0.142 0.142 0.142 0.142  0.073 0.072 0.072 0.073  0.072 0.071 0.071 0.072 
 
4.2.  The Interaction Effect of State Ownership Status and Interlocking Directorate Network 
 
To test hypothesis H2, we add a new variable SOE and a interaction of SOE and centrality measures to 
Eq.(3):  
 
Performancet+i=α0+α1IDNCt+α2SOEt+α3IDNCt×SOEt+αkControlst, i=1,2 or 3                        (6) 
 
SOE is equal to one if a firm is a state-owned enterprise and equal to zero otherwise. We identify SOEs as those 
firms owned by state asset management bureaus or other SOEs controlled by the government. Based on the 
discussions and hypothesis H2 in Section 3.2, we expect a negative and significant coefficient on the interaction of 
SOE and Network. Table 4 reports the pooled regressions of such a specification.  
 
Panel A of Table 4 shows that all the coefficient of SOE are positive and at last significant at the 10% level, 
indicating that SOEs outperform NSOEs. For the coefficients of the interaction of SOE and centrality proxies, nine 
coefficients of twelve are negative and significant, and columns (9), (11) and (12) show the negative value without 
significant. This reveals that the performance effect of interlocking directorates network is more pronounced in 
NSOEs than SOEs Panel B of Table 4 reports the effect of the interaction of SOE and centrality proxies on ROS; 
such a relationship between performance and the interaction of SOE and centrality proxies is still hold. 
 
Table 4. The regression results on the effect of firms’ centrality and state ownership status 
Panel A and Panel B provide the results on the effect of firms’ centrality and state ownership status. DEGREE, EIGEN, BETWE 
and CENTR are proxied by IDNC in column (1, 5 and 9), (2, 6 and 10), (3,7 and 11) and (4, 8 and 12), respectively. The t-values 
in parentheses are clustered at both year and firm levels. Year and industry fixed effect are controlled but not tabulated. *, **, 
***Significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. See Appendix for definitions of variables. 
Panel A: The interaction effect of state ownership status and interlocking directorates on ROA 
 ROAt+1  ROAt+2  ROAt+3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
_cons -0.035 -0.034 -0.031 -0.035  -0.050 -0.048 -0.045 -0.050  -0.059 -0.055 -0.056 -0.059 
 (-1.00) (-0.99) (-0.90) (-0.99)  (-1.00) (-0.97) (-0.92) (-1.00)  (-0.90) (-0.86) (-0.90) (-0.90) 
ROA 0.379*** 0.381*** 0.380*** 0.379***  0.218*** 0.220*** 0.219*** 0.218***  0.218*** 0.219*** 0.219*** 0.218*** 
 (13.97) (13.63) (13.84) (13.97)  (5.09) (5.13) (5.13) (5.09)  (12.81) (13.20) (13.09) (12.83) 
Size 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (1.44) (1.45) (1.40) (1.44)  (1.14) (1.12) (1.08) (1.14)  (0.70) (0.66) (0.73) (0.70) 
Growth 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***  0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004*  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (4.37) (4.38) (4.34) (4.38)  (1.71) (1.68) (1.70) (1.71)  (0.22) (0.18) (0.17) (0.22) 
Capex 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.083***  0.090*** 0.090*** 0.091*** 0.077***  0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.029** 
 (5.50) (5.57) (5.57) (5.79)  (4.39) (4.57) (4.51) (4.64)  (2.97) (3.09) (3.03) (2.53) 
LEV -0.019** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019**  -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.029***  -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.024*** 
 (-2.56) (-2.58) (-2.58) (-2.55)  (-4.42) (-4.42) (-4.35) (-4.43)  (-5.28) (-5.22) (-5.37) (-5.25) 
SOE 0.006* 0.005** 0.004** 0.006**  0.004* 0.005** 0.004* 0.004*  0.006 0.005* 0.006* 0.007* 
 (1.75) (1.85) (1.97) (1.96)  (1.72) (2.02) (1.76) (1.85)  (1.30) (1.84) (1.73) (1.79) 
IDNC 0.014*** 0.691*** 0.936*** 0.440***  0.014** 0.567* 0.811*** 0.342**  0.014** 1.677 0.700* 0.340* 
 (2.87) (2.68) (2.95) (2.63)  (2.15) (1.93) (2.79) (2.41)  (2.04) (1.52) (1.91) (1.78) 
IDNC × SOE -0.002** -0.242** -0.337** -0.010**  -0.002* -0.559* -0.289* -0.006*  -0.001 -0.245* -0.244 -0.004 
 (2.20) (-2.37) (-2.06) (-2.36)  (-1.72) (-1.86) (-1.68) (-1.73)  (-1.01) (-1.74) (-1.31) (-1.12) 
Obs. 8727 8727 8727 8727  7551 7551 7551 7551  6246 6246 6246 6246 
Adj. R2 0.222 0.222 0.222 0.222  0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116  0.103 0.103 0.102 0.103 
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Panel B: The interaction effect of state ownership status and interlocking directorates on ROS 
 ROSt+1  ROSt+2  ROSt+3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
_cons -0.376** -0.378** -0.362** -0.373**  -0.493** -0.491** -0.480** -0.490**  -0.679*** -0.675*** -0.678*** -0.674*** 
 (-2.29) (-2.31) (-2.29) (-2.28)  (-2.36) (-2.38) (-2.32) (-2.35)  (-3.00) (-3.08) (-3.08) (-2.99) 
ROS 0.264*** 0.265*** 0.265*** 0.264***  0.138** 0.140** 0.139** 0.138**  0.161*** 0.162*** 0.162*** 0.161*** 
 (6.54) (6.48) (6.55) (6.54)  (2.26) (2.27) (2.27) (2.26)  (3.14) (3.16) (3.14) (3.14) 
Size 0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 0.019**  0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 0.019**  0.019** 0.018** 0.019** 0.018** 
 (2.57) (2.50) (2.55) (2.58)  (2.31) (2.31) (2.25) (2.31)  (2.34) (2.37) (2.40) (2.34) 
Growth 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.046***  0.018** 0.017** 0.017** 0.018**  -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 
 (3.36) (3.34) (3.32) (3.36)  (2.33) (2.24) (2.23) (2.34)  (-0.81) (-0.92) (-0.92) (-0.79) 
Capex 0.406*** 0.401*** 0.407*** 0.341***  0.356*** 0.355*** 0.355*** 0.283***  0.125 0.125 0.122 0.050 
 (4.26) (4.27) (4.30) (4.58)  (4.15) (4.26) (4.22) (4.49)  (1.39) (1.37) (1.35) (0.48) 
LEV -0.149*** -0.150*** -0.151*** -0.149***  -0.126*** -0.127*** -0.128*** -0.126***  -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.095*** -0.093*** 
 (-2.60) (-2.61) (-2.61) (-2.60)  (-4.25) (-4.23) (-4.18) (-4.25)  (-3.26) (-3.24) (-3.34) (-3.25) 
SOE 0.053*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.058***  0.048*** 0.020* 0.023 0.054**  0.062** 0.024** 0.034** 0.073** 
 (3.02) (4.46) (3.22) (3.05)  (2.69) (1.72) (1.39) (2.55)  (1.98) (2.10) (2.06) (2.18) 
IDNC 0.063** 0.306** 4.200*** 1.107***  0.045* 0.452*** 3.976** 1.132**  0.041** 0.397 3.443* 1.109* 
 (2.20) (2.36) (3.06) (3.18)  (1.75) (3.08) (2.34) (2.17)  (1.99) (1.05) (1.85) (1.80) 
IDNC×SOE -0.079* -0.488** -1.448** -0.241**  -0.078** -0.487* -0.946** -0.243**  -0.099* -0.484* -0.837* -0.333* 
 (-1.81) (-2.37) (-2.39) (-1.99)  (-2.02) (-1.72) (-2.28) (-2.10)  (-1.69) (-1.71) (-1.91) (-1.94) 
Obs. 8727 8727 8727 8727  7551 7551 7551 7551  6246 6246 6246 6246 
Adj. R2 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143  0.074 0.073 0.073 0.074  0.074 0.073 0.072 0.074 
 
In summary, we show that directors of companies sitting on each other’s boards are a frequently observed 
characteristic in China’s transition economy. In spite of this, busy boards are a relatively small incidence in China. 
We document that being central in the interlocking directorate network leads to better performance.  Further, we also 
document that the performance effect of interlocking directorate network vary with state ownership status, and the 
benefits associated with a firm’s network position is more pronounced in NSOEs relative to SOEs. 
 
4.3.  Robust Tests 
 
To further understand the relationship between interlocking directorate networks and firm performance, we 
empirically examine the impact of first order changes in firms’ position on the first order change in firm 
performance. We calculate ∆CENTR as firm’s current value minus its value in prior year. Similarly, we also obtain 
the change dependent variable (∆ROA and ∆ROS) by abstracting pervious value from current value. Table 5 shows 
the estimations from regressing ∆ROA and ∆ROS on ∆CENTR. As in earlier regression specifications, industry and 
year fixed effect are included and standard errors are calculated by clustering by both year and firm. The results 
shows a significant positive relationship between ∆ROA / ∆ROS and change in centrality proxy.  
 
Table 5. The impact of change in firms’ centrality and changes in performance 
This provides the results on the impact of changes in firms’ centrality on the changes in firm performance. The t-values in 
parentheses are clustered at both year and firm levels. Year and industry fixed effect are controlled by not tabulated. *, **, 
***Significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. See Appendix for definitions of variables. 
 ∆ROAt+1  ∆ROSt+1 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
_cons 0.110*** 0.1117***  0.685*** 0.6806*** 
 (2.81) (2.82)  (3.90) (3.86) 
∆ROA -0.317*** -0.316***    
 (-15.10) (-15.00)    
∆ROS    -0.252*** -0.251*** 
    (-5.73) (-5.73) 
Size -0.006*** -0.006***  -0.042*** -0.042*** 
 (-3.16) (-3.20)  (-4.57) (-4.51) 
Growth 0.005*** 0.005***  0.002 0.002 
 (3.29) (3.31)  (0.16) (0.17) 
CAPEX  0.020 0.020  -0.007 -0.006 
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 (1.32) (1.31)  (-0.10) (-0.10) 
Leverage 0.070*** 0.070***  0.428*** 0.428*** 
 (4.52) (4.54)  (5.10) (5.07) 
∆CENTR 0.085*** 0.019***  1.306*** 1.914** 
 (3.34) (3.35)  (3.26) (2.41) 
SOE  0.007*   0.113** 
  (1.94)   (2.42) 
∆CENTR × SOE  -0.004*   -0.090* 
  (-1.78)   (-1.83) 
Obs. 6246 6246  6246 6246 
Adjust R2 0.151 0.164  0.131 0.139 
 
Additionally, prior research has argued that firm performance should be measured by economic value (i.e., 
the present value of future cash flow) rather than the accounting-based performance. Because accounting-based 
performance not only has little ability to capture the risks of interlocking directorates which is an important 
investment, but also involves bias due to the earnings management activities. To address this concern, we imply 
market-adjusted annual stock price return and Tobin’s Q as alternative performance measures. An untabulated result 
reveals the three standard centrality measures and our aggregate proxy are significantly associated with one-year 
ahead market-adjusted stock price return and one-year ahead Tobin’s Q. Further, such an effect is more pronounced 
in NSOEs than SOEs. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
Interlocking directorate network provide a conduit of sharing resource and information flow that can affect the 
performance of firms in the network. In this paper, we seek to add to prior literature by theoretically analyzing and 
empirical testing the relationship between interlocking directorates and firm performance in a transition economy. 
To do this, on the one hand, besides the interlocking directorates’ benefit argued by resource dependency hypothesis, 
we conceptualize interlocking directorate network as a solution of the institutional voids derived from Chinese 
economic reform from central planning to market-oriented economy. On the other hand, by focusing on network 
position, we come up the standard centralities to capture benefit and cost of being networking by interlocking 
directorates, which incorporates not only the interlocks held by a firm but also the importance of these interlocks.  
 
We find that that central firms earn significantly higher future three-year performance than non-central 
firms; this association holds after controlling for the influence of  current performance, firm size, sales growth, 
leverage and capital expenditure investment. Further, we document that the economic effect of interlocking 
directorate network is most pronounced in NSOEs, suggesting that interlocking directorate network may matter 
more for NSOEs. Our results in an additional test also indicate that the changes in centrality are significantly 
associated with the changes in one-year ahead performance.  
 
Our results support our theoretical arguments on interlocking directorate network’s role to fill some 
institutional voids. Our results are also consistent with the resource dependency hypothesis that companies being 
more networked have better access to information, human capital, financial capital, suppliers, etc., hence, resulting 
in an increased future profitability. The positive impact that our network centrality measures have on firm 
performance indicates that not only interlocks of a firm matter, but also the network position of a firm within an 
inter-connect world matter, which have theoretical and managerial implications. These findings suggest that a 
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APPENDIX: Variable Definitions  
 
Variables Definitions 
ROA Ratio of net income tototal assets 
ROS Ratio of net income to Sales 
Growth Change in sales scaled by lagged sales 
Capex Ratio capital expenditures to total assets 
LEV Ratio of liabilities to total assets 
Size The log of total assets 
DEGREE The degree centrality of interlocking directorate networks   
EIGEN The eigenvector centrality of interlocking directorate networks   
BETWE The betweenness centrality of interlocking directorate networks   
CENTR Equal-weighted average of DEGREE, EIGEN and BETWE 
SOE An indicator which equal to one if the firm owned by government, and zero otherwise. 
 
